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National Treatment in Copyright and Related Rights: 




The obligation of national treatment makes an appearance in all five of the 
major active multilateral treaties concerning copyright and related rights, including 
the Berne Convention,1 the Rome Convention,2 the TRIPS Agreement,3 the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (“WCT”),4 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(“WPPT”),5 a group I will collectively call the “five CRR treaties.”   The national 
treatment principle has been praised in part for its administrative convenience: it 
“allows [a treaty] member and its courts to apply their own law – the law they are 
familiar with.”6  Yet it is principally lauded for its substantive bite, as a rule requiring 
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1 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as 
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended on September 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention], Arts. 5(1), 5(3). 
2 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43, entered into force 
18 May 1964 (hereinafter Rome Convention], Arts. 2, 4, 5, 6. 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Marrakesh, 
Morocco, 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement], Art. 3. 
4 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT], Art.  
3. 
5 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) 
[hereinafter WPPT], Art. 4. 
   This article will not consider the Universal Copyright Convention in detail, but it 
also contains a national treatment obligation.  See Universal Copyright Convention, 
Sept. 6, 1952, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter UCC], 
Art. II. The Geneva Phonograms Convention is the one treaty that might be considered 
a major multilateral convention concerning copyright or related rights but that does 
not contain a national treatment obligation.  See Convention for the Protection of 
Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms 
(Geneva, 29 Oct. 1971) 866 U.N.T.S. 67, entered into force 18 April 1973. 
6 Ulrich Loewenheim, The Principle of National Treatment in the International 
Conventions Protecting Intellectual Property, in Patents and Technological Progress 
in a Globalized World: Liber Amicorum Joseph Straus 593, 593 (Wolrad Prinz zu 
Waldeck und Pyrmont, Martin J. Adelman, Robert Brauneis, Josef Drexl & Ralph 
Nack, eds. 2009); see 1 Sam Ricketson & Jane C.  Ginsburg, International Copyright 
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that treaty parties extend protection to non-nationals on the same terms as they do to 
their own nationals.  It is that bite that commentators have in mind when they suggest 
that the “fundamental principle of the [Berne] Convention was national treatment,”7 
or that “[t]he national treatment and MFN principles are cornerstones of the WTO 
legal system, including TRIPS.”8    
Behind that sweeping rhetoric, however, there are reasons to question 
whether the national treatment obligations imposed by the five CRR treaties remain 
of paramount importance in practice.  Together, those treaties now contain far more 
specific substantive minimum guarantees than the Berne Convention did in its first 
incarnation in 1886.  They also contain a variety of specific exceptions and limitations 
to national treatment, from the “Rule of the Shorter Term” in the Berne Convention9 to 
the limitation of the national treatment obligation in the area of related rights to the 
specific rights granted in the applicable treaties.10 At the same time, the choice-of-law 
framework in which “national treatment” may have meant more than non-
discrimination has been substantially transformed.11 Thus, to the extent that countries 
are compelled by treaty to grant nationals of other parties specific rights to specific 
works or productions, and that the laws of those countries do not offer further 
protection, the remaining non-discrimination obligation has little room to operate as 
an independent constraint.12 Perhaps as a result, statistics about proceedings under 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure suggest that the national treatment principle 
is far more important in the context of internal regulation and taxation of goods under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)13 than it is in the context of 
intellectual property under the TRIPS Agreement.  While national treatment has 
                                                                                                                                                                   
and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (hereinafter “Ricketson 
& Ginsburg”) § 6.73 (2d ed. 2005) (national treatment “has clear practical advantages, 
as it means that national courts have only to apply their own laws”). 
7 Stephen P. Ladas, I The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property 83 
(1938); see Gail E. Evans, TRIPs and the Sufficiency of the Free Trade Principles, 2 J, 
World Intellectual Prop. 707, 711 (2005) (“The cornerstone of the Great Conventions 
of the latter Nineteenth Century was the principle of national treatment”). 
8 UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development 26 (2005) 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 144-145. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 119-125.  In addition, non-discrimination 
obligations that may apply to copyright and other intellectual property rights have 
been incorporated into more general human rights treaties, thus rendering the specific 
copyright treaty provisions less important.  See, e.g., Dr. Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual 
Property, Nationality, and Non-Discrimination, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98/wipo_unhchr_ip_pn
l_98_6.pdf. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 146-147. 
12 See Evans, supra note 7, at 714-15 (“National treatment, by reference to a body of 
substantive law so extensive that it effectively codifies the law, appears to be a 
contradiction in nature.”).  Of course, unless treaties contain exhaustive rules 
concerning remedies and procedures (and the five CRR treaties don’t), national 
treatment would still have a role to play. 
13 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter “GATT 1947”], Art. III. 
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featured in over 200 GATT complaints, it has featured in fewer than 20 TRIPS 
complaints.14 Of the only three Dispute Settlement Body decisions finding violations of 
national treatment under TRIPS (two of them involving the same law), none involved 
copyright or related rights.15     
How might we assess the continuing impact of the principle of national 
treatment in the fields of copyright and related rights?  In practice, the impact of 
national treatment may be limited on three different levels.  First, the relevant treaties 
themselves may limit the scope of operation of national treatment.  The treaties may 
contain explicit exceptions to national treatment; their structure may limit the 
operation of the national treatment rule; and they may contain substantive minimum 
requirements that limit the potential impact of national treatment.  Second, countries 
may or may not offer copyright protection that exceeds minimum requirements 
imposed by treaties, and if additional protection is offered, it may be offered by many 
countries, thus limiting the divergence of a national treatment rule from that of a rule 
material reciprocity.  Third, the value of literary and artistic works imported into one 
country from another may be relatively small, thus limiting the economic impact of 
granting broader protection to those works.   
It cannot be within the scope of this article to consider exhaustively all three 
potential layers of limitation.  Consideration of the second layer would require a 
comparison of the copyright laws of all Berne Union members, and consideration of 
the third would require empirical data about the value of literary and artistic works 
transmitted across the borders of all Union members.  This article will, however, 
attempt to consider the first layer reasonably thoroughly, and the second and third 
layers anecdotally.   Part I will consider several aspects of the form of the national 
treatment rule in the context of copyright and related rights, and of intellectual 
property more generally.  Part II will consider the principal issues concerning the 
scope of application of the national treatment rule in the five CRR treaties.  Part III 
will offer some concluding remarks. Among the conclusions will be that although 
national treatment continues to play an interstitial role in specific legal areas, its most 
important function may be as a symbolic carrier of the spirit of internationalism, a 
spirit that may be facing challenges as much from cultural preservationism as from 
economic protectionism. 
I.  The Form of the National Treatment Principle in Treaties  
                                                                    
14 For statistics about proceedings under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, see 
Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, The Dispute Settlement Dataset (January 1, 
1995 – November 6, 2011), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,conte
ntMDK:20804376~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html.   
15 For the three decisions finding violations of TRIPS national treatment obligations, 
see Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (January 2, 2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002); Panel Report, 
European Communities – Protection of trademarks and Geographic Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (Complaint of the United States) [hereinafter 
EG CIs – US], WT/DS174/R (March 15, 2005) (adopted April 30, 2005); and Panel 
Report, European Communities – Protection of trademarks and Geographic 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (complaint of Australia) 




Affecting Copyright and Related Rights 
This Part will address several aspects of the form of the national treatment 
rule in copyright treaties and in intellectual property treaties more generally.  These 
include the issues of the objects of the national treatment obligation; of whether the 
obligation is of a de jure or de facto nature; and of the potential difference between 
“equal” and “no less favorable” treatment. 
A. National Treatment’s Protected Classes: 
Of Persons, Performances, Phonograms, Broadcasts 
The national treatment provisions in four of the five CRR treaties address 
discrimination against persons, natural or legal, on the basis of their nationality.  That 
sets them apart from GATT, which addresses discrimination against imported 
products.16  The oldest of them, Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, is framed in terms 
of discrimination against authors. It provides that, with respect to protected works 
outside their country of origin, covered “[a]uthors shall enjoy . . . the rights which 
th[e] respective laws [of Berne Union members] do now or may hereafter grant to 
their nationals.”17 Article III of TRIPS similarly requires each Member to “accord to the 
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property.”  The WCT 
simply incorporates the national treatment provisions of the Berne Convention,18 
while the WPPT requires its Contracting Parties to “accord to nationals of other 
Contracting Parties . . . the treatment it accords to its own nationals.”19   
Only the Rome Convention explicitly constructs its national treatment 
guarantee by referring to criteria beyond the nationality of protected classes of 
persons.  In the case of performers, for example, Article 2(1)(a) of the Rome 
Convention provides that the level of treatment guaranteed is not just that which 
Contracting States accord to performers that are its own nationals, but that which 
Contracting States accord to such performers “as regards performances taking place, 
broadcast, or first fixed, on its territory.”20  In other words, with respect to non-
nationals protected under the Convention, Contracting States cannot discriminate 
against performances that took place, were broadcast, or were first fixed in a foreign 
country, any more than they can discriminate on the basis of the performer’s 
nationality.  Similarly, the Rome Convention guarantees to protected non-national 
producers of phonograms the level of protection accorded to domestic producers for 
the phonograms that they first fixed or published domestically,21 and to protected 
non-national broadcasting organizations the level of protection accorded to 
                                                                    
16 See GATT 1947, Art. III. 
17 Berne Convention Art. 5(1).  Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention closes what would 
otherwise be a loophole in the prohibition of discrimination against foreign authors by 
requiring national treatment within the country of origin if the author of the work at 
issue is not a national of that country.  See Berne Convention Art. 5(3). 
18 See WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 3. 
19 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Art. 4. 
20 Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(a). 
21 Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(b). 
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broadcasters with domestically located headquarters for the broadcasts that they 
transmitted from domestically located transmitters.22  
B. Protection Against De Jure or De Facto Discrimination, and At What Level? 
The structure of the national treatment provisions under the five CRR 
treaties invites the question whether those provisions protect only against laws that 
explicitly treat non-nationals (and in the case of the Rome Convention, specified 
activities with foreign locations) unequally – what is sometimes called de jure 
discrimination – or also against laws that reach some level of unequal impact on non-
nationals – de facto discrimination.   
1. Close proxies.  Although there is no case law under the Berne or Rome 
Conventions or the WIPO Internet Treaties that addresses the form of protection 
under their national treatment guarantees, one can imagine that discrimination on the 
basis of close proxies of nationality could be prohibited as obvious attempts at 
circumvention, even without fully embracing a de facto approach. Thus, for example, a 
law offering higher levels of copyright protection to residents than to non-residents 
should run afoul of national treatment obligations, even though some non-nationals 
may be residents and some nationals non-residents.23  Similarly, discrimination against 
a work on the basis of foreign first publication – offering higher protection to works 
first published domestically than those first published in the territories of other treaty 
members – should also run afoul of national treatment obligations, though nationals 
will sometimes first publish abroad and non-nationals domestically.24 
2. TRIPS and “Effective Equality of Opportunities.”  In the three proceedings in 
which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has found a violation of the TRIPS national 
treatment obligation, panel and appellate body reports have adopted a more 
thoroughgoing de facto approach to that obligation, based on case law under GATT 
1947.  In United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, both the Panel and 
the Appellate Body decided that the appropriate standard to apply under Article 3.1 of 
TRIPS was whether a measure provided “effective equality of opportunities as 
between [nationals and non-nationals] in respect of protection of intellectual property 
                                                                    
22 Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(c). 
23 Both the Berne Convention and TRIPS recognize and reinforce the close relationship 
between residency and nationality.  Thus. For example, the Berne Convention 
provides that “[a]uthors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union but 
who have their habitual residence in one of them shall, for the purposes of this 
Convention, be assimilated to nationals of that country.”  Berne Convention Art. 3(2).  
TRIPS provides that the term “nationals” includes, in the case of a separate customs 
territory, persons who are domiciled in that territory.  See TRIPS Art. 1(3), fn. 1; Panel 
Report, Panel Report, EG CIs – US, ¶ ¶7.163 – 7.167194, WT/DS174/R (interpreting 
“separate customs territory” to include only subdivisions of countries, and not the 
European Community).   
24 The Rome Convention explicitly prohibits discrimination against phonograms on 
the basis of their foreign publication. See Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(b).  That might 
lead some to argue that the absence of such an explicit prohibition in the other CRR 
treaties means that they must allow such discrimination, but application of such a 
canon across different treaties is dubious at best.  
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rights.”25 That standard was drawn from a decision under the GATT 1947 treaty, 
which held that “[t]he words ‘treatment no less favourable’ in paragraph 4 [of Article 
III of GATT 1947] call for effective equality of opportunities for imported products in 
respect of the application of laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products.”26   
The Section 211 proceeding involved a United States federal law that 
distinguished on its face between US nationals and nationals of other countries, and 
the Reports in that case therefore did not have occasion to consider how the “effective 
equality of opportunity” standard might be applied to a measure that did not facially 
distinguish on the basis of nationality. Such an occasion was provided in the two 
proceedings involving the European Communities Regulation on the protection of 
geographical indications (“GIs”).  That Regulation created Community-wide 
protection for registered GIs, but imposed additional burdens on registration of GIs 
for areas outside of the EC, and as interpreted by the Dispute Settlement Panels, 
effectively required reciprocal protection by the non-EC countries where such areas 
would be located.  The EC argued that such disadvantages did not violate the TRIPS 
Art. 3.1 national treatment obligation because they accorded formally identical 
treatment to nationals and non-nationals, since they were based on the location of the 
area covered by a GI registration rather than the nationality of the applicant.  The 
Panel appointed in both proceedings rejected that argument, however, and concluded 
that the distinctions drawn by the Regulation closely aligned with nationality.  That 
panel found that “the vast majority of natural and legal persons who produce, process 
and/or prepare products according to a GI specification within the territory of a WTO 
Member party to this dispute will be nationals of that Member,”27 and that “the GIs 
for which nationals of other WTO Members would wish to obtain protection are 
overwhelmingly located outside the European Communities.”28 
Exactly what degree of disparate impact, or of alignment between nationality 
and a challenged law’s classification, must be shown to establish a TRIPS Article 3 
violation, is an open question, as is the degree to which a country’s reasons for 
adopting a provision independent of favoring nationals should be taken into account.29  
                                                                    
25 Panel Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,  ¶ 
8.131, WT/DS176/R (August 6, 2001),  see Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 258, WT/DS176/AB/R (January 2, 
2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002) (agreeing with the Panel Report that a measure “ ‘could 
be considered to provide a less favourable treatment to nationals of other Members as 
it denies effective equality of opportunities" to non-United States nationals in the 
United States ‘”). 
26 Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.11, BISD 
36S/345 (adopted November 7, 1989). 
27Panel Report, EG CIs – US, ¶ 7.194, WT/DS174/R; Panel Report, EC GIs - Australia,  
¶7.230, WT/DS290/R.   
28  Panel Report, EG CIs – US, ¶ 7.196, WT/DS174/R; Panel Report, EC GIs - Australia,  
¶7.232, WT/DS290/R. 
29 Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfus have argued that national 
treatment analysis under TRIPS should inquire more directly into the motivation for 
adopting particular provisions, because a variety of non-discriminatory motives 
should be considered consistent with TRIPS.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. 
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One classification within the realm of copyright and related rights that might require 
further exploration of those questions is that of literary works distinguished on the 
basis of the language in which they are written.  Some public lending right schemes, 
for example, offer benefits for works written in or translated into one language, 
typically the national language, but not for those written in or translated into other 
languages.30  To be sure, in many cases there will be a strong correlation between 
language and nationality – for example, most authors writing in or translating into or 
from Swedish are probably Swedish nationals.31  The government of Sweden, however, 
would argue that it has an interest in making materials available in Swedish that is 
independent of the differential benefits that the scheme may end up providing to 
Swedish nationals: it would be delighted, no doubt, if many non-Swedish nationals 
began to write in Swedish.  Moreover, it would be strange if some language-based 
schemes survived TRIPS Article 3 scrutiny because many non-nationals wrote in the 
national language – France, for example, could point to Belgians, Swiss, Canadians, 
Moroccans and others who wrote in French – while other identical schemes were 
struck down because fewer non-nationals wrote in the national language. 
Once one holds that de facto discrimination is prohibited by a national 
treatment guarantee, it appears to be tempting to hold that it is always the impact of 
the scrutinized provision that matters, and thus that even explicit “de jure” legal 
distinctions on the basis of nationality will not automatically run afoul of national 
treatment.  Thus, its 2001 decision in Korea – Various Measures on Beef,32 the WTO 
Appellate Body held that measures that formally treated nationals and non-nationals 
differently did not automatically violate the national treatment obligation in Article 
III.4. of GATT:  
A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic 
products is . . . neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Article 
III:4. Whether or not imported products are treated "less favourably" than 
like domestic products should be assessed instead by examining whether a 
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the 
detriment of imported products.33  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Dreyfus, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International 
Intellectual Property Regime 100-102 (2012) 
30 For comparative documentation of existing public lending right programs, seePLR 
International, Established PLR Regimes, 
http://www.plrinternational.com/established/established.htm.  
31 The Swedish public lending right scheme covers literary works written in Swedish, 
translations to or from Swedish and books written in foreign languages by authors 
permanently residing in Sweden.  See 
http://www.plrinternational.com/established/plradministrators/sweden.htm.   
Exactly how the inclusion of all permanent residents in the scheme should affect the 
national treatment analysis, and whether that provision could be found severable, are 
open questions. 
32 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted January 10, 
2001). 
33 Id.  at ¶ 137. 
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Two final comments on the national treatment obligation under copyright 
treaties.  First, the economic and cultural interests that benefit from national 
treatment violations under copyright treaties may be different than those benefiting 
from national treatment violations involving goods under GATT.  Differential 
overregulation or overtaxation of imported products will presumably increase their 
cost, thus harming domestic consumers and benefiting domestic producers.  By 
contrast, differential underprotection of foreign authors is likely to reduce the cost of 
consuming their works, thus benefiting domestic consumers and harming domestic 
authors.34  Analogously, a U.S. International Trade Commission study estimated that 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, by lowering barriers to trade in goods, would harm 
U.S. textile producers and reduce textile prices for U.S. consumers;35 at the same time, 
by strengthening intellectual property protection, they would benefit U.S. 
manufacturers of recorded media (encompassing computer software, sound 
recordings, and videos) and raise prices for consumers of that media.36  However, some 
schemes that arguably violate the national treatment obligation in copyright and 
related rights are more likely to harm domestic consumers and benefit domestic 
producers.  One example that is discussed further below is a tax on all movie tickets 
the proceeds of which are distributed solely to domestic movie producers    
Second, it is not clear that either GATT or TRIPS national treatment analysis 
is equipped to deal with a situation in which an entire broad category of goods or 
works of authorship is primarily produced abroad, and the entire category is 
regulated, taxed or underprotected with the goal of improving domestic balance of 
trade.  Suppose, hypothetically, that 95% of perfumes and other fragrances are 
produced abroad, and 5% domestically. A tax on all fragrances will then primarily 
burden non-nationals, and will likely reduce consumption of foreign goods if 
consumer spending is diverted to a range of other goods that are on average more 
likely to be produced domestically.  Yet if consumers, faced with high perfume prices, 
end up buying a wide variety of other goods – some buy flowers for presents instead, 
others buy chocolates or leather goods or liquor – it is not clear that any of those 
others can be considered “like goods” for purposes of performing GATT national 
treatment analysis.  Similarly, if perfumes were largely formulated abroad but often 
imitated domestically, it is not clear that under current TRIPS Article 3 analysis the 
refusal to consider the original formulation “authorship” and the scent a copyright-
protected work would be considered a violation of the obligation to treat nationals of 
other WTO members “no less favorably” than a country’s own nationals.  
C. Equal Treatment vs. “No Less Favorable” – In Some Respects a False Dichotomy 
 It may appear that some copyright treaties, such as the Berne Convention, 
guarantee foreign authors treatment equal to domestic authors, whereas others, such 
as TRIPS, guarantee a different level of treatment, namely treatment “no less favorable 
than” domestic authors.  However, this different wording is in at least some respects 
likely not to result in a difference in practice.  Suppose, for example, that a law 
                                                                    
34In both cases, the benefitted parties might be reversed in the long run if the 
regulation or refusal to extend protection were part of a strategy to demand reciprocal 
treatment from foreign countries.  
35 See I United States International Trade Commission, Potential Impact on the U.S. 
Economy and Industries of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements, Investigation No. 
332-353, at IV-9 (1994). 
36 See id. at VII-18 – VII-19. 
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restored copyright in works of foreign authors that had fallen into the public domain 
for lack of compliance with formalities, but did not restore copyright in such works of 
domestic authors.37  Such a law does not treat foreign authors less favorably that 
domestic authors, and hence does not violate TRIPS, but it clearly does not treat 
foreign and domestic authors equally.  However, domestic authors could not claim a 
violation of Berne national treatment, because they are not beneficiaries of that 
provision, or indeed of the entire Convention.  At the same time, foreign authors, 
unable to show any injury from having their copyrights restored while those of 
domestic authors had not been, should not be able to claim a violation of Berne 
national treatment either.  Thus, such a case should turn out no differently under 
Berne than under TRIPS. 
It may be that the TRIPS national treatment provision would be interpreted 
to encompass a broader range of de facto disparate impact violations than the Berne 
provision.  Although TRIPS Article 3 is explicitly limited by the national treatment 
exceptions enumerated in the treaties it incorporates,38 it does not seem that it would 
be limited by the form of national treatment obligation in an incorporated treaty with 
respect to rights covered by that treaty.  In other words, the TRIPS Article 3 national 
treatment guarantee with respect to intellectual property, including copyright, is 
independent of the Berne Convention Article 5 guarantee, and apart from the specific 
Berne exceptions it incorporates, follows its own form, which may include greater de 
facto analysis than Berne Article 5.39 
II.  The Scope of the National Treatment Principle in Treaties  
Affecting Copyright and Related Rights 
 This article now turns to the issue of the scope of application of the national 
treatment rules discussed in Part I.  This Part will consider several of the principal 
issues of scope of application, including the works or other productions to which the 
rules apply, the rights subject to the rules, remedies, acquisition of rights, term, and 
ownership. 
A. Subject-matter: Works or Productions 
to Which National Treatment Obligations Apply 
 With respect to the subject matter protected by a national treatment 
guarantee, the provisions of the five CRR treaties are partially but not entirely 
                                                                    
37 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (restoring copyright in certain works under somewhat more 
complicated terms than those posed hypothetically in the text). 
38 See TRIPS Art. 3(1) (providing that the Article 3 national treatment guarantee is 
“subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention 
(1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”). 
39 Of course, TRIPS also incorporates the Berne Article 5 national treatment 
obligation.  See TRIPS Art. 9 (incorporating Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne 
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto, excepting Article 6bis).  Thus, if the 
Berne Article 5 obligation were found to prohibit some provisions that the TRIPS 
Article 3 obligation did not – say, formally different treatment that did not deny 
effective equality of opportunity - those provisions could also amount to a violation of 
TRIPS that could theoretically result in the authorization of sanctions.  It is not clear 
what those sanctions would be, however. 
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independent of each other.  The Berne Convention defines the subject matter to which 
it applies in Article 2(1). TRIPS and the WCT both incorporate that provision, and 
both also contain two provisions that at least clarify and arguably expand Berne 
Convention subject matter.  Neither TRIPS nor the WPPT incorporate the Rome 
Convention provisions defining protected subject matter, but they identify subject 
matter that is congruent with Rome Convention subject matter.  
1. Literary and Artistic Works: Berne and its Incorporation into TRIPS and the WCT.  The 
Berne Convention identifies its subject matter both by providing a general definition 
of a term and by enumerating specific examples that it states are not-exclusive.  The 
general term is “literary and artistic works,” defined as “including every production in 
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression.”40   That definition is followed by an enumeration of many more specific 
examples of covered types of works – from books to cinematographic works and 
architecture.41   
It is clear that specifically listed or enumerated works must be protected by 
Berne Union members, and are subject to obligations regarding the absence of 
formalities, substantive minimums, and national treatment.  Article 2(6) provides that 
“[t]he works mentioned in this Article shall enjoy protection in all countries of the 
Union,”42 Article 5(1) requires Union members to grant authors “in respect of works 
for which they are protected under this Convention” both national treatment and the 
specific minimum protections recognized in the Convention, and Article 5(2) provides 
that enjoyment of such rights “shall not be subject to any formality.”  
The obligations with regard to unenumerated literary and artistic works are 
less clear, as is the nature of the line separating literary and artistic works from other  
productions that would not qualify as literary and artistic works.  The enumeration of 
literary and artistic works in Article 2(1) is structured to be non-exclusive, preceded 
as it is by the phrase “such as.”43  Most commentators, however, take Article 2(6)’s 
reference to “works mentioned in this Article” to mean specifically enumerated types 
rather than the overarching category of “literary and artistic works,”44 and conclude 
that the revision history of Berne suggests that Union members are not obligated to 
protect any types of works that are not enumerated.45 
                                                                    
40 Berne Convention art. 2(1) 
41  See id. 
42 Berne Convention Art. 2(6). 
43 See Berne Convention Art. 2(1). 
44 See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg § 8.09 (“It is of critical importance for a work to be 
included in the list in article 2(1) because article 2(6) . . . puts it beyond doubt that 
such works are then to be protected under the Convention.”); Silke von Lewinski, 
International Copyright Law and Policy § 5.76 (2008) (under Article 2(6), “only the 
works explicitly mentioned in Article 2(1), (3) and (5) of the Berne Convention must 
be protected by Union countries in the Berne context.”); Wilhelm Nordemann, Kai 
Vinck, Paul Hertin & Gerald Meyer, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
Law: Commentary with Special Emphasis on the European Community Art. 2/2bis BC 
n. 2 (1990) (“The list of individual categories of works in Art. 2 par. 1 is not exhaustive.  
But the right to protection under convention law is limited to this catalogue.”)  
45 See, e.g., 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg §§ 8.08, 8.11. 
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 If a Union member decides to protect a type of production that is not an 
enumerated work, two issues arise. First, is that type of production a “literary and 
artistic work”? If not, then the production falls completely outside of the scope of the 
Convention, and protection for that production need not meet any Convention 
requirements.  Second, if a Union member extends protection to a production 
determined to be an unenumerated literary and artistic work, must its protection of 
that work comply with both Berne substantive minimums and the national treatment 
obligation, or only the latter? 
a. The outer boundaries of “literary and artistic work.” With regard to the first 
question, there are two principal schools of thought.  Some commentators, such as 
Stephen Ladas46 and Sam Ricketson,47 have argued that the Berne Convention leaves it 
up to Union members to decide whether a particular type of unenumerated 
production is a literary and artistic work.  According to those commentators, one 
must look to the treatment of the production in the Union member’s own laws.  If 
those laws treat a production as a literary and artistic work – if they include the 
production alongside Berne-enumerated works as copyrightable subject matter – then 
with respect to that country, the production is a “literary and artistic work” within 
the meaning of Berne.  Under that approach, for example, because the United States 
treats sound recordings as copyrightable subject matter alongside literary works and 
other Berne-enumerated works,48 it must meet at least some Berne Convention 
obligations with respect to sound recordings.  By contrast, countries such as France 
and Germany that do not group sound recordings with enumerated Berne works need 
not meet Berne obligations with respect to them. 
The other school of thought insists that the Berne Convention itself provides 
a determinate answer to the question of whether a particular production counts as a 
“literary or artistic work,” and that countries that group productions that are not 
Berne Convention literary or artistic works together with those that are do not have 
any Berne Convention obligations with respect to the former.  Adherents of that 
school include Fritz Ostertag,49 Eugen Ulmer,50  and David Vaver.51 Thus, Vaver argues 
that “‘[a]uthor’ in the [Berne Convention] implies a person who applies his/her 
personal creativity to produce a literary or artistic work.”52  The text of the Berne 
Convention does not include such a definition, but with respect to collections of 
works (sometimes referred to as compilations), it does require protection to such 
collections which “by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, 
                                                                    
46 See Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property 
266 (1938). 
47 See Sam Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property ¶14.22 (1984) 
48 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing “sound recordings” as a category of works of 
authorship in which copyright subsists). 
49 See Fritz Ostertag, La Protection des disques étrangers en Suisse, 53 Le Droit 
d’Auteur 41 (1940). 
50 See Eugen Ulmer, The “Droit de Suite” in International Copyright Law, 6 Int. Rev. of 
Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 12, 21 (1975). 
51 See David Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal 
Copyright Conventions Part One, 17 Int. Rev. of Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 577, 590-597 
(1986).   
52 Id. at 594. 
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constitute intellectual creations,”53 and one can argue that that provision makes 
explicit with regard to collections a requirement of “intellectual creation” that is 
implicit with respect to all literary and artistic works.54  
Under that interpretation, some productions that are not enumerated in the 
Berne Convention would seem more likely to be found to be Berne Convention 
“literary and artistic works,” whereas others would not.  Contrast, for example, 
perfumes and databases.  The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has ruled that the 
copyright law of the Netherlands protects perfumes.55  The creation of a perfume, as a 
particular olfactory experience, would seem to involve an exercise of personal 
creativity.  There are no hard-and-fast rules for making a good perfume; the process 
involves the application of judgment to the creation of a product of aesthetic appeal.  
Moreover, the olfactory experiences can apparently be fixed stably enough and 
perceived subtly enough to be recognized as “the same” or “different” on different 
occasions.  People will recognize Chanel No. 5 or Shalimar from bottles made years 
apart, an important condition for being recognizable as a “work.”  Thus, once a 
country recognizes copyright protection for perfumes, it is likely to be subject to 
Berne Convention obligations with respect to them.56 
                                                                    
53 Berne Convention Art 2(5). 
54 Paul Goldstein, joined by Bernt Hugenholtz in the third edition of his treatise, seems 
to take a hybrid position.  He argues that some unenumerated productions will 
definitely fall within the definition of “literary and artistic works” and therefore be 
subject to Berne obligations whether or not a country extends protection to them 
under its copyright laws.  See Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law 
and Practice 73-74 (1st ed. 2001) (hereinafter “International Copyright (1st ed.)”); Paul 
Goldstein & Bert Hugenholtz, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice 
102-103 (3rd ed. 2013) (hereinafter “Goldstein & Hugenholtz (3rd ed.)”).  Other 
unenumerated productions will not fall within that definition, but if a country 
nonetheless protects them in its copyright law, then they should be subject to the 
Berne national treatment obligation (but not to substantive minima).  Goldstein 
argues that the latter conclusion is supported by considerations both of  
“economiz[ing] on line-drawing around rights and subject matter coming within the 
national treatment obligation” and of “deference to the legislature’s motives in 
choosing to place the copyright label on that which, at lesser international expense, it 
could have called by another name.”  Paul Goldstein, International Copyright (1st ed.) 
74-75;  Goldstein & Hugenholtz (3rd ed.) 103-104. 
55 See Lancôme/Kecofa, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands], 16 June 2006, NJ 585. 
56 In fact, in the Lancôme case, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands was recognizing 
protection for a foreign national, Lancôme, which was a company organized under 
French law.  Because both the Netherlands and France are members of the European 
Union, the Netherlands would presumably have to extend protection of perfumes to 
French nationals under the non-discrimination principle of Article 18 of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union, regardless of whether the Berne Convention 
applied.  See European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, Art. 18; Phil Collins v.Imtrat 
Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, [1993] ECR I-5145, c 92/92 (October 20, 1993).   Application of 
a rule of material reciprocity would result in denial of protection to Lancôme, since the 
Cour de Cassation in France has refused to recognize copyright protection for 
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Both TRIPS and the WCT acknowledge that databases can be Berne 
Convention literary or artistic works.  Building on the language applied by Article 2(5) 
of Berne to collections, TRIPS and the WCT declare that if “by reason of the selection 
or arrangement of their contents [databases] constitute intellectual creations,”57 they 
must be protected as literary or artistic works.  However, if a law protects databases 
regardless of any creative judgment involved in their creation, then those objects of 
protection are not Berne Convention literary or artistic works.  The most prominent 
example of the latter type of protection is, of course, Article 7 of the European 
Database Directive, which grants protection to databases in which creators can show 
“qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, 
verification or presentation of the contents.”58  The creations protected under that 
Article – all gatherings of information in which a substantial qualifying investment has 
been made – are quite clearly not “literary and artistic works,” since principles of 
“intellectual creation,” “authorship,” or “creativity” do not define them.  Therefore, 
they do not fall within the scope of the Berne Convention, and the Convention does 
not require the European Union to grant either substantive minima or national 
treatment to them.  In fact, of course, the European Union does neither.  It provides 
protection for a less-then-Berne-minimum of 15 years,59 and it provides protection to 
those who are neither nationals nor habitual residents of EU member states only by 
specific further agreement, thus contemplating a requirement of material reciprocity.60   
To be sure, it will be difficult to determine whether some productions are 
Berne literary and artistic works by application of an abstract concept alone.  In some 
cases, more concrete historical treatment will be relevant.  David Vaver expresses the 
view that “performers, sound recorders, broadcasters and the like are neither ‘authors’ 
nor do they create ‘literary and artistic works.’”61  Whether or not that is ultimately 
true or not – and I have argued that at least with regard to musical sound recordings 
and those who create them it is not62 – it does seem that those who participated in the 
diplomatic conferences in which the Berne Convention was drafted and revised 
believed it to be true, and that only such an interpretation explains the separate 
history of the Rome Convention.   
Before TRIPS and the WCT, it was also difficult to figure out whether 
computer programs were Berne Convention literary works.  The production of 
computer programs of any complexity does seem to involve creative judgment, but in 
many cases computer programs end up performing a function that has no expressive 
or aesthetic component: they may just regulate an industrial process or execute a 
                                                                                                                                                                   
perfumes.  See Beaute Prestige International v Senteur Mazal, Cour de Cassation (Case 07-
13952, July 1, 2008) (ruling that perfurmes not protected under French copyright law). 
57 TRIPS Art. 10(2); WCT Art. 5. 
58 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 
on the legal protection of databases, Art. 7. 
59 Id. Art. 10. 
60 Id. Art. 11. 
61 Id. at 594. 




commercial transaction. However, TRIPS and the WCT have resolved that issue, as 
they declare that computer programs will be treated as literary works under Berne.63  
In the case of one type of production that falls at the borderline of the Berne 
concept of “artistic work” – industrial designs – the Convention itself provides specific 
directions, and a specific exception to national treatment.  Article 2(7) of the 
Convention provides that “[w]orks protected in the country of origin solely as designs 
and models shall be entitled in another country of the Union only to such special 
protection as is granted in that country to designs and models; however, if no such 
special protection is granted in that country, such works shall be protected as artistic 
works.”64  Thus, if Country A, a Berne Union country, decides to grant only sui generis 
protection to industrial designs, and not copyright protection, and Country B, also a 
Berne Union country, grants both sui generis and copyright protection for such works, 
then under Article 2(7) Country B does not have to grant works originating in 
Country A copyright protection, as it would otherwise have to under the principle of 
national treatment.  
b. Non-Enumerated works under Berne: national treatment alone, or substantive minima as 
well?  Some commentators, notably Ricketson & Ginsburg65 and Nordemann et al.,66 
can be read as contending that protection of literary and artistic works not 
enumerated in Berne is subject only to the national treatment requirement, and not to 
the requirement of compliance with Berne substantive minima.  That would provide a 
larger role for national treatment.  Yet Silke von Lewinski has argued that protection 
of unenumerated literary and artistic works should be subject to the full set of Berne 
obligations,67 and indeed Article 5(1) accords national treatment and substantive 
minima protections in a single sentence, leaving little room for a textual argument that 
only national treatment would apply to unenumerated works.68  Thus, it is unclear 
                                                                    
63 See TRIPS Art. 10(1); WCT Art. 4. 
64 Berne Convention Art. 7. 
65 See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg § 8.11 (“In the absence of enumeration, if Union country 
A decides that a new category of work is a literary or artistic work entitled to 
protection under its own law, it is bound to accord the same protection to authors 
from other Union countries under the principle of national treatment . . . .”). 
66 See Wilhelm Nordemann, Kai Vinck, Paul Hertin & Gerald Meyer, International 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Law: Commentary with Special Emphasis on the 
European Community Art. 2/2bis BC n. 2 (1990) (“For a new class of works that is no 
enumerated in the catalogue, the Union author can claim protection only on the basis 
of national treatment of Union authors, i.e., make a claim if national law already 
provides for such protection (Art. 19) . . . .”) 
67 See Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy § 5.76,  § 5.76 n. 14 
(2008).  
68 See Berne Convention Art. 5(1). Nordemann et al. seem to suggest that Article 19  
would provide a basis for claiming national treatment independent of Article 5, but 
this would most likely involve a misreading of Article 19.  Article 19 makes it clear that 
Berne Union authors are not limited to claiming protection meeting the substantive 
minimums of Berne if the principle of national treatment required more, or if national 
law happened to extend greater protection to them even when it was not required to 
do so under the Convention.  However, Article 19 does not itself seem to impose 
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whether national treatment has additional importance with respect to unenumerated 
works to which Berne substantive minimum requirements might not apply. 
2.  Performances, Phonograms, and Broadcasts: the Rome Convention, TRIPS, and the 
WPPT. There has been less controversy over subject-matter coverage of the Rome 
Convention, TRIPS and the WPPT with respect to their national treatment 
obligations regarding performances, phonograms, and broadcasts, perhaps because 
their subject matter is defined more narrowly than “literary and artistic works.”  The 
Rome Convention defines “performers” as those who “perform literary and artistic 
works,”69 and thus its guarantee of national treatment to performers does not extend 
to those performers whose performances are spontaneous or would not otherwise 
count as performances of literary and artistic works, such as clowns, acrobats, 
jugglers, and athletes performing in sporting events.70  The WPPT has a similar 
definition, but includes those who “perform literary or artistic works or expressions of 
folklore.”71  The latter term sweeps in some performances that are not of fixed works 
with identifiable authors, but only a certain class of such performances – many 
performances of clowns, jugglers, and so on, involve neither literary and artistic works 
nor folklore. Phonograms, as fixations or representations of sounds not accompanied 
by images, seems to be a relatively well-defined category.72  While broadcasts are not 
                                                                                                                                                                   
additional obligations on Berne Union members.  See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg §§ 6.81, 
6.82 (discussing the history of Article 19). 
69 Rome Convention Art. 3(a) (defining “performers” as “actors, singers, musicians, 
dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise 
perform literary or artistic works”); see Rome Convention Art. 4 (granting national 
treatment to performers under certain conditions). 
70 Article 9 of the Rome Convention provides that “Any Contracting State may, by its 
domestic laws and regulations, extend the protection provided for in this Convention 
to artists who do not perform literary or artistic works.”  It is not clear, however, that 
a contracting state that did so would be required to provide national treatment, since 
the national treatment obligation of Article 4 only applies to “performers,” not “artists 
who do not perform literary and artistic works.” 
71 WPPT Art. 2(a) (emphasis added).  “Folklore” is not defined in the WPPT; for a 
discussion of what might be included by that term, see II Ricketson & Ginsburg § 
19.40. 
72 The Rome Convention defines “phonogram” as “any exclusively aural fixation of 
sounds of a performance or of other sounds.”  Rome Convention Art. 3(b).  The WPPT 
defines “phonogram” as “the fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other 
sounds, or of a representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation 
incorporated in a cinematographic or other audiovisual work.”  WPPT Art. 2(b).  The 
WPPT definition is possibly slightly broader, but the changes were made principally 
to accommodate new technologies, rather than to substantially broaden coverage.  The 
“representation of sounds” clause was added to account for the possibility that 
phonograms can be created directly on recording media, using, for example, digital 
sound synthesis, without ever having to create sounds and then fix them through 
transduction.  The WPPT also allows the possibility of sound to be fixed together 




covered by the WPPT, the Rome Convention defines broadcasting as “transmission by 
wireless means for public reception,”73 thus excluding cable or Internet transmissions. 
B.  Rights: Of Protection Above Minimum Guarantees  
and Remunerations that May Not Be Rights 
1.  Rights in Literary and Artistic Works: The Berne Convention and TRIPS.  The 
obligation of national treatment in the Berne Convention, and in TRIPS as regards 
copyright, clearly extends to any rights that domestic law grants authors with respect 
to their literary and artistic works, in addition to those rights that are specifically 
required as substantive minimums of protection.  Thus, for example, although neither 
Berne nor TRIPS requires parties to grant a general right of distribution,74 United 
States copyright law does grant such a right,75 and Berne and TRIPS then require the 
United States to extend that distribution right to non-nationals.  Underlining this 
obligation, Article 5(1) of Berne explicitly requires national treatment, not only with 
respect to rights recognized at the time of accession to the Convention, but rights 
created in the future – it grants to protected authors with respect to protected works 
“the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their 
nationals.”76  
The most obvious rights granted by many Union members that would seem 
to exceed Berne and TRIPS substantive minimums yet fall within national treatment 
are those included in the WCT.  They include the “making available” right77 and the 
obligations concerning technological measures78 and rights management 
information.79  Because these are indeed required by the WCT, national treatment 
would step in only with regard to nationals of those countries that are parties to Berne 
and/or TRIPS but not the WCT. As of this writing, however, there are still a 
significant number of such these.  There are 76 countries that are members of Berne 
but not of the WCT, including countries such as Canada and India.80  Thus, only 
national treatment would require the United States and other Berne and TRIPS 
parties that have implemented the WCT domestically to accord to the works of a 
                                                                    
73 Rome Convention Art. 3(f). 
74 See Berne Convention Art. 14(1)(i) (granting a right of distribution in 
cinematographic works). 
75 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
76 Berne Convention Art. 5(1). 
77 See WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 6(1). 
78 See WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 11. 
79 See WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 12(1). 
80 See Contracting Parties > WIPO Copyright Treaty,  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (total 
contracting parties: 90);  Contracting Parties > Berne Convention, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (total 
contracting parties: 166). 
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Canadian author like Robertson Davies81 or an Indian author like Arundhati Roy82 a 
“making available” right or a right against circumvention of technological measures. 83  
In this regard, it is important to note that Article 20 of the Berne Convention 
should not be interpreted to create an exception to the national treatment obligation 
imposed in Article 5.  Article 20 provides that “[t]he Governments of the countries of 
the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so 
far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by 
the Convention . . . .”84  The WCT itself is such a special agreement, and it does grant 
authors more extensive rights than are guaranteed in Berne.  Like Berne, the WCT 
imposes no obligations on parties with respect to their own nationals.  Thus, if each 
party to the WCT granted nationals of other parties, but not its own nationals, the 
rights that the WCT guaranteed, then the Berne Convention would not require 
extension of those rights to nationals of countries that were Berne Union members but 
not WCT parties.  In practice, however, WCT parties do grant the rights guaranteed 
by the WCT to their own nationals.  Once they do that, the national treatment 
guarantee of Berne steps in, and requires them to extend the same rights to nationals 
of all Berne Union members, even if they are not WCT parties.  In addition, the most 
favored nation obligation of TRIPS Article 4 would require WTO members to extend 
any rights granted to the nationals of one other member to those of all other members 
even if they did not grant those rights to their own nationals.85 
In practice, this set of circumstances would seem to be one of the reasons 
why the United States has been pursuing so-called “TRIPS-plus” copyright 
protections in free trade agreements, rather than bilateral copyright treaties.  Once the 
United States has granted additional rights either to its own nationals or to the 
nationals of any other WTO member, it cannot use those rights as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations requesting reciprocity; it must grant those rights to nationals of all other 
WTO members.  By contrast, Article XXIV(5) of GATT specifically exempts free trade 
agreements meeting certain conditions from both the national treatment and most 
favored nation obligations,86 and hence the United States can use the enticement of 
lower trade barriers with regard to goods to induce both reciprocal trade barrier 
reductions and higher copyright protection. 
The areas of controversy over the definition of “rights” for purposes of Berne 
Convention national treatment have concerned various laws that provide payments to 
                                                                    
81 See, e.g.,  Robertson Davies, The Fifth Business.  
82 See, e.g.,  Arundhati Roy, The God of Small Things. 
83 See Jane C. Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public, in 
Intellectual Property in the New Millennium, Essays in Honor of William R. Cornish 
234 (David Vaver & Lionel Bently, eds. 2004)   (“Berne Convention members who 
have not yet ratified the WCT are not obliged to enforce foreign Berne Union authors’ 
rights of making available (unless that country’s own authors enjoy such a right, in 
which case the principle of national treatment would require extending the same 
protection to Unionist authors).”). 
84 Berne Convention Art. 20. 
85 See TRIPS Art. 4. 
86 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 Art. XXIV(5); Understanding on 




authors rather than grant exclusive rights.  These include schemes such as private 
copying levies, public lending rights, and droit de suite laws.  How do we determine 
whether such schemes grant rights that are subject to the national treatment 
obligation?  Paul Goldstein, building on previous work by Elisabeth Steup87 and Peter 
F. Burger,88 has suggested that there are three elements that constitute an economic 
right subject to Berne national treatment.   
First, such a right is “effective against the world at large.”89  This 
distinguishes copyright from mere contractual rights.   
Second, a Berne right “enables the author to control, or to benefit from, the 
use of a literary work.”90  This element deserves more detailed unpacking.  The rights 
that the Berne Convention grants are rights of authors to particular works.  Thus, 
rights that authors might have independent of particular works, such as rights to 
various subsidies or pensions, would not count as Berne rights that trigger a national 
treatment obligation.  Moreover, a right “to benefit fro[m] the use of a literary work” 
would seem to require that payment is being made at least roughly by users of the 
work.  Suppose that a government is funding a scheme of subsidies to authors from 
general tax revenues, and that it distributes those subsidies in proportion to the 
revenues the authors have received from sales of their works. Would the restriction of 
those subsidies to authors who are nationals of that country violate the Berne national 
treatment obligation?  While other WTO treaties do regulate subsidies with regard to 
goods in industries such as agriculture91 and manufacturing,92 and embody a 
commitment to negotiate limitations on subsidies with regard to services,93 neither 
the Berne Convention nor TRIPS purport to regulate general government subsidies to 
authors. Thus a subsidy to national authors from general tax revenues should not 
                                                                    
87 See Elisabeth Steup, The Rule of National Treatment for Foreigners and its 
Application to New Benefits for Authors, 25 Bull. Copr. Soc’y 279, 284 (1978).  Steup 
defines as the essential elements of copyright protection that the right be granted “to 
(1) a person in his capacity as author (2) of a determined work, and, (3) the right being 
related to the utilization of that work.”  Id. 
88 See Peter F. Burger, The New Photocopy Remuneration Provisions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Their Application to Foreign Authors under International 
Copyright Law, 19 I.I.C. 488, 500-501 (1988). 
89 Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice § 3.2.3.1 at 81 
(2001). 
90 Id. 
91 See Agreement on Agriculure, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, Art. 6 (domestic support 
commitments), Art. 9 (export subsidy commitments). 
92 See GATT 1947 Art. XVI (subsidies); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, Art. 3 (certain subsidies in both agriculture 
and manufacturing). 
93 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 
1167 (1994), Art. XV. 
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count as a violation of the Berne or TRIPS national treatment obligations.94  Yet 
neither should Berne rights be restricted to compensation that is derived from “a 
particular use by a particular user.”95  After all, even compensation tied to the making 
of a copy – the quintessential author’s right of reproduction – is not compensation 
derived from a particular use by a particular user, since copies can be used by many for 
many different purposes, and resold many times, and the value of the copy on first sale 
typically reflects that multiplicity of possible uses and users.      
Third, a Berne right “values the use of the work, however roughly, 
proportionate to the work’s success or prospective success in the marketplace.”96  This 
third element is in some ways a further unpacking of the second element, detailing just 
what it means to be a right connected with a work, not just with authorship.  Just as 
payments approximating an exclusive right must at least in some rough way come 
from users of works, they must also be distributed to authors or copyright owners 
roughly in proportion to the frequency of use of their works.   
Schemes that satisfy all three of these conditions do not just look similar to 
Berne exclusive rights; they also have a similar political or public choice profile.  A 
scheme providing benefits to authors that is funded by general tax revenues must 
compete with other objects of legislative desire in the appropriations process.  By 
contrast, a separate levy on users isolates the scheme from such competition.  A levy 
on the use of copyrighted works the proceeds of which are used for general cultural 
purposes will draw the critical scrutiny of domestic authors, who will view it as 
reducing demand and redistributing away from successful works.  By contrast, a levy 
on the use of all works the proceeds of which are distributed to authors of domestic 
works in proportion to their success accomplishes a redistribution from foreign 
authors to domestic authors, and will be welcomed by the latter, leaving the interests 
of foreign authors to be represented only by diffuse groups of users. 
Consider the application of this three-element definition of a Berne right to 
four different types of remuneration schemes. 
a. Public lending payments.  Most public lending subsidies are funded through 
general tax revenues, rather than by fees specifically assessed with respect to books 
lent.  According to the Public Lending Right International Network, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg fund their public lending payments through fees paid by libraries,97 
and France funds its payments in part through fees paid by suppliers of books to 
                                                                    
94 For a contrary view, see Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne 
Convention, Third Session, BCP/CE/III/2-III, ¶ 87, at 26 (1993). 
95 David Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal 
Copyright Conventions Part Two, 17 I.I.C. 715, 718 (1986) (“The author would have a 
‘right’ against [a home taping fund funded by levies on home taping hardware or 
software] but it would not be in respect of a particular use by a particular user, any 
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manufacturers.”).   
96 Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice § 3.2.3.1 at 81 
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libraries.98  All other governments with existing public lending schemes fund them 
from general tax revenues.99  Thus, the fact that only citizens of Israel writing in 
Hebrew or Arabic are eligible for payments under the Israeli public lending scheme,100 
or that only Hungarian authors and foreign authors under reciprocal agreements are 
eligible under the Hungarian scheme,101 should not violate the national treatment 
obligations of Berne or TRIPS.  Yet the fact that the Luxembourg scheme, funded by 
fees assessed to libraries and distributed to authors in accordance with the number of 
times their books are lent, is limited to authors who are residents of Luxembourg,102 
should raise serious doubts about whether it is violation of Luxembourg’s national 
treatment obligation under Berne and TRIPS.103 
b. The French motion picture subsidy system.  France subsidizes production of 
French films with funds collected almost entirely from three special taxes: a tax on 
movie theatre tickets, a tax on television broadcasting, and a tax on the sale of 
videos.104 All three of the taxes are more in the nature of targeted user fees than general 
income or sales taxes.  For example, the tax on movie theatre tickets, known as the 
“Taxe sur le prix des entreés en salles” or “Taxe Spécielle Additionelle” (TSA), is 
imposed at the rate of 10.7% of the price of each movie theatre ticket.105  There is no 
question that foreign movies are generating revenues under this system.  In 2010, for 
example, 47.5% of all movie tickets sold in France were to movies made in the United 
States, and 16.7% to movies made in other countries outside of France, while only 
35.7% of admissions were to movies made in France.106  The funds generated by these 
taxes, however, are used to subsidize only certain films.  Movie production companies 
                                                                    
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 In testimony before a committee of the United States House of Representatives in 
1993, Mihály Ficsor, then Director of the Copyright Department of WIPO, concluded 
that the public lending right concerning books and similar publications was a “de 
facto” exception to national treatment, “because it relates to an act that traditionally 
has not been considered to be part of the normal exploitation of works and whose 
source is quite exceptional in the field of copyright, namely, in the majority of cases, 
the budget of the government or the municipalities concerned.”  Prepared Statement of 
Mihály Ficsor, Director, Copyright Department, World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), Geneva, Switzerland, in A Possible Protocol to the Berne 
Convention, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial 
Administration of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 35, at 55, 61. 
104 See generally Emmanuel Cocq and Patrick Messerlin, French Audio-Visual Policy: 
Impact and Compatibility with Trade Negotiations, HWWA Report No. 233, 
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/26105/1/re030233.pdf.   
105 See Ministère de la Culture et de la Communications, Chiffres Clés 2012 – 




106 See id. 
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that are “established outside Europe” are disqualified altogether from receiving 
subsidies, and movies otherwise must amass a certain minimum number of qualifying 
points, which are awarded for such characteristics as hiring French actors or workers 
and the use of the French language in the film.107  The discrimination is thus in part de 
jure (the exclusion of non-European production companies) and part de facto (the use 
of qualifying characteristics that closely correlate with French authorship), and would 
seem to violate Berne and TRIPS national treatment obligations if they applied.   
There is a good argument that the national treatment obligations do apply, at 
least as to a portion of the subsidies.  About half of the subsidies are awarded as  
“soutiens sélectifs,” or discretionary support, while the other half is spent on “aides 
automatiques,” automatic aid.108  Since 1989, automatic aid has been granted on the 
basis of a percentage of total receipts generated by a qualifying movie, including 
receipts from theatrical exhibition, television broadcast, and video sales.  That formula 
thus tracks market success, satisfying Paul Goldstein’s third element of a Berne 
right.109  At least in part, then, the French system pretty clearly magnifies the market 
success of French films, while blunting the market success of non-French films, 
violating the Berne and TRIPS national treatment obligations. 
c. Private copying levies.  Many countries have instituted levies on equipment 
that can make copies of works of authorship (as well as of productions protected by 
related rights), from photocopiers to audio and video equipment, and on blank media 
from paper to magnetic tape and optical disks, with the purpose of recouping some of 
the value lost to owners of copyright from private copying.  These levies are typically 
paired with copyright exceptions for private copying, and those exceptions can raise 
issues, not only of national treatment, but of the right of reproduction specifically 
guaranteed by Berne,110 and of the “three-step tests” for exceptions under both Berne111 
and TRIPS.112  Considering just the issue of national treatment, however, the levies 
themselves are not general income or sales taxes, but use-related levies that should 
satisfy the criterion of being closely enough derived from users of a work. Indeed, in 
the European Union, the well-known Padawan case has had the effect of more tightly 
focusing levies on equipment that is actually used for private copying.113  Thus, the 
                                                                    
107 See Emmanuel Cocq and Patrick Messerlin, supra n. 89, at 10. 
108 See Centre National du Cinéma et de l’Image Animée, Rapport D’Activité 2011 du 
Centre National du Cinéma et de l’Image Animée 13 (2012), available at 
http://www.cnc.fr/web/fr/publications/-
/ressources/2437585;jsessionid=DB42D069ED9E9BAEAE62F2497CC79482.liferay. 
109 See supra p. xx. 
110 See Berne Convention Art. 9(1).  For a discussion of how private copying provisions 
may implicate Berne substantive minima, see I Ricketson & Ginsburg § 6.97, at 317-
318. 
111 See Berne Convention Art. 9(2). 
112 See TRIPS Art. 13. 
113 See Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE), (C-467-08), 
2010 WL 4116866 (ECJ (2010)) (holding that the indiscriminate application of a 
private copying levy to all copying equipment, including equipment acquired by 
business entities for purposes clearly unrelated to private copying, violates Article 
5(2)(b) of the “Infosoc Directive,” Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament 
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crucial issue would seem to be how the funds so collected are distributed.  Some 
countries distribute some or all of the funds so generated, not to authors in some 
rough proportion to the use of their works, but for local cultural causes more 
generally.114  Other countries, however, do distribute private copying levy funds to 
authors using some technique of sampling of sales.115 In such cases, a private copying 
levy should be subject to Berne and TRIPS national treatment obligations.116  France 
has justified its refusal to distribute funds from its levy on audiovisual media to US 
film producers on the ground that it has no agreement with the United States 
regarding “producers of videograms,” yet as several commentators have argued, the 
works in question are audiovisual works, covered by the Berne Convention and TRIPS 
and subject to their national treatment obligations.117 
 d. Droits de Suite.  A droit de suite or resale right is a limited exception to first 
sale exhaustion of copyright in the original embodiment of a work, such as a painting 
or a sculpture.  It entitles the artist to a portion of a higher subsequent sale price.  
Whether droits de suite would be subject to the general Berne Convention national 
treatment obligation is an interesting question, but in 1948 the Brussels revision of the 
Convention foreclosed such speculation by adopting a specific provision for droits de 
suite.  Article 14ter provides for a droit de suite, but makes its application subject to 
material reciprocity. Article 14ter(2) states that the droit de suite “may be claimed in a 
country of the Union only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so 
permits.”118 
   2. Rights in Performances, Phonograms, and Broadcasts: the Rome Convention, TRIPS, and 
the WPPT.  While the national treatment provisions regarding copyright-protected 
works in Berne and TRIPS clearly extend beyond the minimum rights granted in those 
treaties, the national treatment provisions regarding performances, phonograms, and 
broadcasts are arguably more limited. 
 Article 2(2) of the Rome Convention provides that “[n]ational treatment 
shall be subject to the protection specifically guaranteed, and the limitations 
specifically provided for, in this Convention.”  That could just mean that even if 
domestic law provides Rome-mandated national treatment, that law will be further 
tested to see if it complies with Rome-mandated specific minimum protections, and 
the limitations thereto. The WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention adopts that 
interpretation.  It states that the import of Article 2(2) is that “[e]ven if a Contracting 
State does not grant [the] minima [established in Articles 7, 10 and 13] to its own 
                                                                                                                                                                   
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society). 
114 See Gillian Davies and Michèle E. Hung, Music and Video Private Copying: An 
International Survey of the Problem and the Law (1993). 
115 See id. 
116 Commentators reaching this conclusion include Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, 
see I Ricketson & Ginsburg § 6.97, at 618; Paul Goldstein and Bernt Hugenholtz, see 
Goldstein & Hugenholtz (3rd ed.) 111; and Peter Burger, see Peter F. Burger, supra note 
xx, at 500-501.  
117 See, e.g, II William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice 1310-1311 (1994).  
118 Berne Convention Art. 14ter(2). 
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nationals, it must do so to nationals of other Contracting States.”119  Yet others have 
argued that Article 2(2) limits the national treatment obligation in the Rome 
Convention to those minimum required protections.120 This would not render the 
Rome national treatment obligation completely meaningless, for the Rome 
Convention minima leave leeway concerning the form of protection, particularly with 
respect to performances.  Article 7 guarantees performers “the possibility of 
preventing” certain acts, such as the unauthorized fixation of their performances, but 
that language was specifically adopted so that both criminal remedies and various 
forms of civil remedies could satisfy Article 7 requirements.121  Thus, even under a 
limited interpretation, the Rome national treatment obligation would guarantee that 
if a party granted its nationals civil injunctions and damages for unauthorized 
fixations of performances, non-nationals would also be entitled to such remedies. 
 Regardless of the interpretation of the general national treatment provision in 
the Rome Convention, Article 16 of the Convention allows parties to limit their 
obligations with respect to the Article 12 right of equitable remuneration for public 
performances (broadcasts and communications to the public) of phonograms.  One of 
the options is to adopt a requirement of reciprocity, protecting foreign producers of 
phonograms only to the extent that the countries of which they are nationals protect 
the phonograms of the nationals of the country adopting reciprocal treatment.122  Most 
of the largest parties to the Rome Convention, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, and 
Spain, have made declarations adopting a reciprocal scheme,123 thus making 
reciprocity, rather than national treatment, the dominant regime for public 
performance of phonograms. 
 If the national treatment limitations in the Rome Convention are ambiguous, 
those in TRIPS and the WPPT are not.  In the case of related rights, both TRIPS and 
the WPPT explicitly limit their national treatment obligations (and in the case of 
TRIPS, its most favored nation obligation) to the particular related rights granted in 
those respective treaties.124  In the case of TRIPS, at least, this may explained in part 
                                                                    
119 Claude Masouyé, Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms 
Convention ¶ 2.2, at 19 (1981). 
120 See Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy § 6.27, at 201 and 
201 n. 70 (2008). 
121 Rome Convention Art. 7(1); see Claude Masouyé, Guide to the Rome Convention 
and to the Phonograms Convention ¶¶ 7.4, 7.5, at 34-35 (1981). 
122 See Rome Convention Art. 16(1)(a)(iv). 
123 See UNESCO, International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations 1961, Declarations and Reservations, 
at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13645&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#RESERVES 
124 See TRIPS Art. 3(1) (“In respect of performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organizations, this [national treatment] obligation only applies in 
respect of the rights provided under this Agreement.”); TRIPS Art. 4(c) (exempting 
from the most favored nation obligation “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
accorded . . . in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organizations not provided under this Agreement”); WPPT Art. 4(1) 
(imposing a national treatment obligation “with regard to the exclusive rights 
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by the fact that otherwise, the national treatment and most favored nation obligations 
could extend to all “related rights,” which would be a problem because there is no 
generally recognized definition for this term.125  Yet there is a more pointed history 
behind these limitations.  The US recording industry, in particular, would have liked a 
stronger national treatment obligation with respect to phonograms, because 
significant revenues are generated in Europe and elsewhere from both public 
performance of sound recordings and private copying levies, and if US sound 
recordings were eligible to receive a portion of those revenues, that portion would be 
substantial.126   
In the end, however, the national treatment obligations were limited so as to 
deny US firms access to public performance revenues, and probably to revenues from 
private copying levies as well.  As for public performances, the national treatment 
obligation in TRIPS is subject to Rome Convention exceptions, thus allowing 
countries to make Article 16 declarations adopting a regime of reciprocity.127 Similiarly, 
the WPPT’s national treatment obligation is truncated when a party declares that it 
will not fully implement the right to equitable remuneration for broadcasting and 
communication to the public.128  The US had to make such a declaration, because US 
law only provides for such a right in the case of digital audio transmissions;129 hence, 
other WPPT parties are under no national treatment obligation with respect to public 
performances of phonograms not protected by US law.130   
                                                                                                                                                                   
specifically granted in this Treaty, and to the right to equitable remuneration provided 
for in Article 15 of this Treaty”). 
125 Article 3 of TRIPS generally requires national treatment “with regard to the 
protection of intellectual property”; “intellectual property” is defined in Article I as “all 
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part 
II,” TRIPS Art. I(2), and Section 1 of Part II is titled “Copyright and Related Rights.” 
See Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis § 2.59, at 198 
(4th ed. 2012) (advancing this explanation).   
126 See, e.g., Prepared Statement of Jason S. Berman, President, Recording Industry 
Association of America, in A Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 
35, at 112-114. 
127 See TRIPS Art. 3(1); supra text accompanying notes 122-123. 
128 See WPPT Art. 4(2) (limiting the national treatment obligation “to the extent that 
another Contracting Party makes use of the reservations permitted by Article 15(3) of 
this Treaty”); Art. 15(3) (providing for declarations limiting the obligation to 
recognize a right of equitable remuneration for broadcasting and communication to 
the public of phonograms). 
129 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (providing a digital audio transmission right); WPPT 
Notification No. 8, Ratification by the United States of America, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/wppt/treaty_wppt_8.html (containing a 
declaration limiting implementation of Article 15 to digital audio transmissions). 
130 The North American Free Trade Agreement contains a broader national treatment 
provision with respect to sound recordings.  Its general national treatment obligation 
extends “to the protection and enforcement of all intellectual property rights”; the 
specific exception for sound recordings provides for reciprocity for performers’ rights 
in secondary uses, but not for producers’ rights in such uses: “In respect of sound 
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 The situation with respect to private copying levies regarding phonograms is 
a bit more complicated.  If copying is the activity, then the underlying right is the right 
of reproduction, a right guaranteed to phonogram producers by Article 14(2) of 
TRIPS131 and Article 11 of the WPPT132 Thus one could easily imagine an argument that 
to the extent that national law provides remuneration to phonogram producers for 
certain types of unauthorized reproduction in lieu of the ability to prevent that 
reproduction altogether, the national treatment obligation should apply to that 
remuneration.133  The United States, however, tried but failed to get specific 
guarantees of national treatment with regard to rights of remuneration in both TRIPS 
and the WPPT.134 The drafting history of Article 4 of the WPPT, in particular, 
suggests that many countries did not want the obligation of national treatment to 
reach private copying levies or rights of remuneration more generally, and that they 
thought that the wording of Article 4 as eventually adopted accomplished that 
objective.135  Article 4(1) guarantees national treatment “with regard to the exclusive 
rights specifically granted in this Treaty, and to the right to equitable remuneration 
provided for in Article 15 of this Treaty.”136  The argument is that limiting the 
guarantee to “specifically granted exclusive rights” excludes rights of remuneration, 
since rights of remuneration are not “exclusive rights”; the only right of remuneration 
covered is the explicitly mentioned right to equitable remuneration for broadcasting 
and public communication.  This argument has been advanced by Jörg Reinbothe and 
Silke von Lewinski,137 and accepted by Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg.138  
                                                                                                                                                                   
recordings, each Party shall provide such treatment to producers and performers of 
another Party, except that a Party may limit rights of performers of another Party in 
respect of secondary uses of sound recordings to those rights its nationals are 
accorded in the territory of such other Party.”   North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Washington, D.C., 12 Dec. 1992), U.S.-Can.-Mex., U.S. Gov’t Printing Office (1992), 
entered into force 1 Jan. 1994, Art. 1703. 
131 See TRIPS Art. 14(2). 
132 See WPPT Art. 11. 
133 For such an argument, see Andrew F. Christie, John Davidson, and Fiona Rotstein, 
Canada’s Private Copying Levy – Does It Comply with Canada’s International Treaty 
Obligations?, 20 I.P.J. 111, 128-129 (2008); Mihaly Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the 
Internet 614 (2002). 
134 With regard to TRIPS, these unsuccessful attempts are mentioned in IV The Gatt 
Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994) 510-511, 516, 518, 520, 524 
(Terence B. Stewart, ed., 1999). 
135 For an account of that history, see Jörg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, The 
WIPO Treaties 1996, 279-284 (2002).  For a U.S. proposal for a broader provision that 
would guarantee national treatment with respect to “rights which derive from any 
exclusive right provided in this Treaty, including but not limited to rights of 
remuneration,” see Submission of the United States of America on the New Article 4, 
SCCR/4/3 (February 21, 2000)   , available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/html.jsp?file=/redocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_4/sc
cr_4_3.html.  
136 WPPT Art. 4(1).  The recently concluded Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances uses the same language to express its national treatment obligation. See  
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, adopted on June 24, 2012, Art. 4(1). 
137 See id. at 287-288.  
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C.  National Treatment and Other Dimensions of Protection: 
Remedies, Acquisition, Term and Ownership 
 Although the issues of works or productions protected and rights granted are 
the most central to the scope of a national treatment obligation in copyright and 
related rights, those issues do not exhaust the dimensions of protection.  How does 
national treatment operate with regard to such further issues as remedies, acquisition 
of rights, term of protection, and ownership and transfer of rights?   
1.  The Berne Convention (and the WCT).  Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention (also 
incorporated by reference in the WCT) refers only to works and rights, and to modern 
eyes this language might seem not to address other dimensions of protection.  It seems 
more likely, however, that the Berne drafters believed that, subject to the explicit 
substantive minima and exceptions in the Convention itself, they were accomplishing 
what Stephen Ladas called “the complete assimilation of foreigners to nationals, 
without condition of reciprocity.”139  
As for remedies, that expansive view gains support in Article 5(2), which 
refers to “the means of redress afforded the author to protect his rights” as one of the 
dimensions left to national law but presumably subject to the national treatment 
guarantee.140  One issue that arises in that regard is how to understand the relation 
between “the means of redress,” left to national law, and “the enjoyment and exercise 
of” the author’s rights, which Article 5(1) prohibits from being “subject to any 
formality.”141 US law takes the position that Article 5(1) requires an accommodation in 
respect of foreign works to enable the filing of lawsuits alleging infringement in them 
without the formality of registration required for United States works.142  However, 
US law also takes the position that “the exercise of rights” to be kept free of 
formalities does not extend to the remedies of statutory damages and attorney’s fees. 
The latter are made available only on condition that the infringed work has been 
registered before the infringement; 143 following the national treatment obligation, that 
condition is applied equally to nationals and foreigners.  If that tracks the correct 
interpretation of Articles 5(1) and 5(2), then here the national treatment obligation is 
doing work where a substantive minimum – the prohibition on formalities – does not 
apply.144   
                                                                                                                                                                   
138 See II Ricketson & Ginsburg §§ 19.49, 19.50.  Ricketson and Ginsburg seem to be 
influenced principally by drafting history and perhaps by the specific mention in the 
WPPT of a single right of remuneration, since with respect to the Berne Convention, 
they advance the argument that within the scope of applicable exclusive rights, rights 
of remuneration are tantamount to compulsory licenses.  See I Ricketson & Ginsburg § 
6.97. 
139 Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property 365 
(1938). 
140 Berne Convention Art. 5(2). 
141 Berne Convention Art. 5(1). 
142 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
143 See 17 U.S.C. § 412. In the case of published works, § 412 creates a grace period for 
registration of three months after publication. 
144 At least two copyright owners have attempted to challenge the US Copyright Act’s 
requirement that foreign works have been registered before the claimed infringement 
to be eligible for statutory damages and attorney’s fees, but courts have that because 
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Acquisition and term are two dimensions separately covered in Berne. As to 
the former, the Article 5(2) prohibition on formalities precludes Union members from 
imposing conditions such as registration or notice on the acquisition of copyright in a 
work, and Article 2(2) allows Union members only to impose a requirement of 
fixation as a condition of protection.145 As to the latter, Article 7(8) establishes the so-
called “Rule of the Shorter Term,”146 providing a default rule of reciprocity with 
respect to term, perhaps the single most important explicit exception to national 
treatment in the Convention.  This exception to national treatment for term, together 
with the 1993 EU Council Directive’s extension of copyright term in Europe to life of 
the author plus 70 years, was an important motivation for the US to extend its 
copyright term from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years in 1998.147   
Sierd Schaafsma has argued convincingly that, as an historical matter, the 
Berne Convention national treatment provision was intended to encompass a choice-
of-law rule under which issues of ownership would also be resolved by the law of the 
country in which protection was sought.148  Given vast changes in general approaches 
to conflicts of laws,149 however, it is hard to know how the original understanding of 
the Convention should be implemented in the present day, and it is clear that some 
                                                                                                                                                                   
the Berne Convention is not self-executing in the United States, it is not possible to 
challenge federal law on the basis of conflict with Berne.  See Elsevier B.V. v. 
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 2010 WL 150167, *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); The Football Ass’n 
Premiere League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
145 See Berne Convention Arts. 5(2), 2(2). 
146 See Berne Convention Art. 7(8). 
147 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of 
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 Official J. Eur. Coms. (L 
290), p. 9; Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, §102(b), 112 Stat. 2827-
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148 See Sierd J. Schaafsma, Intellectuele eigendom in het conflictenrecht : de verborgen 
conflictregel in het beginsel van nationale behandeling (2009).  Schaafsma is not the 
first commentator to advocate a connection between the national treatment provision 
in Berne and the choice of law principle of lex protectionis. Indeed, Mirelle van 
Eechoud has argued that this is the majority position among commentators.  See 
Mirelle van Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights 106-107 & 107 n. 
300 (2003); compare, e.g., Paul Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: 
Infringement and Ownership Issues, 51 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 315, 328-329 (2004) 
(Berne national treatment regime includes a lex protectionis choice-of-law rule) with 
Goldstein & Hugenholtz (3rd ed.) 131 (Berne national treatment is a non-
discrimination principle that does not include a choice-of-law rule).  However, 
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of-law framework of the mid-nineteenth century. 
149 Essentially, this involved a shift from the doctrine of statutes to the “interest” or 




courts do not feel bound to decide issues of ownership of foreign works as if they had 
been produced domestically.150 
2. TRIPS.  Paradoxically, the TRIPS national treatment provision may be seem 
to list more aspects of protection than the Berne Convention, and yet not quite reach 
the “complete assimilation” ideal implicitly embodied in the original understanding of 
Berne.  TRIPS guarantees national treatment with respect to “the protection of 
intellectual property,” and “protection” is defined as including “matters affecting the 
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights 
specifically addressed in this Agreement”151 That is a long and broad list, and yet 
TRIPS does not include a choice-of-law rule.  Thus, it would not seem even arguably 
to violate TRIPS national treatment to determine ownership through application of 
the law of the country of origin rather that the country of protection. 
3. The Rome Convention and the WPPT.  Although this article, consistent with 
common usage, has been using “national treatment” to describe obligations imposed 
by all five CRR treaties, neither the Berne Convention, nor the WCT, nor TRIPS use 
the terms “national treatment” or “treatment” in their operative language.  That use is 
left to the Rome Convention and the WPPT.  The Rome Convention obligates parties 
to provide “the treatment accorded by the domestic law of the Contracting State in 
which protection is claimed”152 to nationals regarding specified activities occurring in 
its territory.  The WPPT requires each party to “accord to nationals of other 
Contracting Parties . . . the treatment it accords to its own nationals” with regard to 
covered rights.153  The term “treatment” seems quite expansive, evincing the “complete 
assimilation” spirit of the Berne drafters, when not limited by other provisions in these 
treaties.  While the Rome Convention permits the formality of notice on 
phonograms,154 the WPPT prohibits all formalities along the lines of Berne.155  Neither 
Rome nor the WPPT contains a “rule of the shorter term”; if parties grant terms of 
protection longer than the required minimums to their nationals, they must grants 
those terms to the nationals of other parties.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 How much work does national treatment do in the area of copyright and 
related rights? As warned at the beginning, this article has not provided a 
comprehensive answer to this question.  Rather, it has surveyed major issues of treaty 
interpretation in those areas, and it has made some anecdotal observations about 
national laws actually in force and the value of exported and imported works and 
productions.  
                                                                    
150 See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 
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As for the form of the national treatment guarantee, potentially the most 
important development is the incorporation of de facto GATT analysis into TRIPS.  
However, the practical impact of that analysis in the area of copyright and related 
rights may be limited, because it may be difficult to identify “like goods” or “like 
works” with respect to an entire category of works of authorship, such as perfumes or 
fragrances, that is excluded from copyright protection.  
As for works and productions covered, before TRIPS specifically recognized 
computer programs as literary works, there might have been room for a category of 
works of great value, unenumerated in Berne, to be protected only by national 
treatment.  At present, however, there does not currently seem to be any category of 
works of comparable economic value that is not enumerated in Berne or TRIPS.  It is 
unlikely that sound recordings would be found to be Berne-protected works in 
countries in which they are treated under copyright rather than under a related rights 
scheme, but if so, national treatment could have a greater role to play.   
As for rights covered, the national treatment obligation with respect to rights 
of remuneration continues to be controversial. Perhaps the principal lesson in this area 
is that the pressure to deviate from national treatment may be coming, not from 
economic protectionism, but from cultural preservationism and nurturing of local 
culture.  Stephen Siwek estimates that the revenues flowing into the United States 
from other countries from the sale of software in 2010 was $98.60 billion, which 
dwarves the foreign revenues from motion pictures ($23.89 billion), sound recordings 
($6.48 billion), and books and periodicals ($5.05 billion).156 Yet private copying and 
public lending levies and France’s motion picture taxes do not touch software; they 
are targeted at traditional cultural goods like books, movies, and records, and their 
unequal treatment of foreigners seems primarily motivated by promotion of local 
culture, and concerns about domination by the United States and the English 
language, rather than by worries about the balance of payments. 
It is clear that in areas in which national treatment would lead to major 
imbalances in the scope of protection, such as copyright term or public performance 
for sound recordings, countries have negotiated exceptions to the national treatment 
obligation, leaving national treatment to cover rights of less economic consequence.  
Although national treatment continues to have substantial interstitial force, the 
greatest value of national treatment in copyright and related rights may be, not the 
specific economic benefits it provides, but the spirit of internationalism it conveys, 
and the gentle nudge it provides to legislatures and judges away from petty 
protectionism.  In 1977, Elisabeth Steup remarked that “solutions restricted to national 
authors will set examples for other national legislatures and initiate a backward 
development from international protection to nationalism at a time when the 
international exchange in culture is growing and the international protection of 
authors is more needed than ever before.”157  Over 35 years later, that statement still 
rings true, and the principle of national treatment still best crystallizes that spirit of 
internationalism. 
 
                                                                    
156 See Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2011 Report 17 
(2011) (Table A-5). 
157 Elisabeth Steup, The Rule of National Treatment for Foreigners and its Application 
to New Benefits for Authors, 25 Bull. Copr. Soc’y 279, 290 (1978).   
